Monday, September 19, 2022

From Lodha to Ramana: the Chief Justices of the Modi era

 From Lodha to Ramana: the Chief Justices of the Modi era


In its most essential form, the Indian Supreme Court is the custodian of the Constitution of India. In this role, its primary responsibility is to ensure that the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution are not diluted, eroded, or otherwise impinged upon by the state. It might have begun its existence as a passive court, but over the decades, it has become what I believe to be the most powerful court among its peers in the world.


This superior status manifests itself in at least three ways. Firstly, through its decision in Keshavananda Bharati, the Court assumed the power of judicial review over constitutional amendments. Secondly, through multiple decisions, it assumed the power of judicial appointments to itself and High Courts. And thirdly, it expanded the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution through guaranteeing citizens unique and wide ranging protections, and ensuring the right to approach courts through public interest litigation.


At its helm sits the Chief Justice of India, or the CJI. The duties and responsibilities that come with the office of the CJI are unmatched by any other role in the country. In theory, at least, the CJI must exhibit judicial and administrative talent of an unusually high order. A sample of the responsibilities of the office include selecting judges for appointment to the higher judiciary, deciding the number and composition of benches to adjudicate on different kinds of cases, besides performing normal judicial duties. As George H. Gadbois puts it, the Chief Justice should be ‘a competent administrator, a shrewd judge of men and personalities, and a towering personality himself’.


But, by dint of circumstance, and to some degree by choice, the Indian judiciary evolved to follow the seniority convention in appointing the Chief Justice of India. As a result, while the persons who eventually become Chief Justice may not have been appointed for exhibiting certain qualities, they are compelled to develop these skills on the job, and some have done so with aplomb, e.g., Justice Subba Rao, Justice Venkatachaliah, and Justice J.S. Verma. However, an unfortunate fallout of the seniority convention is that Chief Justices tend to have very short tenures in office. Over 75 years, the Indian Supreme Court has already had 49 Chief Justices. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, in the 1980s, had an exceptionally long tenure of over seven years, while at the other extreme, Justice K.N. Singh occupied the office for a mere 17 days.


Three periods


This large number of Chief Justices provides for an interesting data set to study the evolution of the office, and the relationship of the judiciary with the executive, which can be roughly classified into the following eras. From 1950 to 1971, the Chief Justice had complete authority over judicial appointments, and the recommendation of the Chief Justice would always be followed, even to the extent of powers of a veto.


Between 1971 and 1993, strong single party governments occupied the Centre, and the executive insisted on appointing ‘committed judges’ to the Supreme Court, in a clear attempt at court packing. Multiple supersessions took place, with the executive exercising prerogative in appointing Chief Justices, and the seniority convention was openly flouted. The shocker came with the decision in the first judges’ case in 1981 (SP Gupta), where it was held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would not be binding on the government.


With the second judge’s case in 1993, and around when Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah took over as the CJI, the trend reversed and the judiciary practically wrested the power of appointments back from the executive. Judicial primacy and the collegium’s creation happened in this period, and while the collegium has since acquired considerable notoriety for being arbitrary and undemocratic, it still occupies the field today.


When we examine the evolution of the Indian Supreme Court and the office of the CJI, it is a classic example of a constant shifting and rebalancing of power between the judiciary and the executive. When the executive was powerful, the judiciary practically succumbed to the executive’s control. However, when relatively weaker coalition governments were elected, the judiciary restored powers to itself.


This rebalancing is playing out again now. Since 2014, the executive is once again a single party majority under the Narendra Modi-led BJP government. Consequently, the judiciary’s powers are weaker than before, and the executive is back in control. We see a rise in autocratic tendencies of the executive, through the slow destruction of democratic institutions, the misuse of investigating agencies, communal polarisation, and a gradual chipping away at constitutional protections available to citizens, all of which a weak judiciary is unable or disinclined to tackle.


From 2014 to 2022, the eight years the Modi government has been in power, eight individuals have occupied the office of the CJI, from Justice R.M. Lodha as the 41st Chief Justice to Justice N.V. Ramana as the 48th. This article attempts to examine how their tenures have contributed to the evolution of the Court and the office of the CJI.


The CJIs of the Modi era


Immediately before the Modi government first came to power in 2014, the CJI was Justice P. Sathasivam, who, rather unfortunately, chose to accept the Governorship of Kerala almost immediately after he demitted office. This unusual and arguably irregular appointment was made without an appropriate cooling period, and went against the BJP government’s own policy, with Arun Jaitley having openly proclaimed that giving jobs to judges upon retirement would help governments influence courts. This also set a dangerous precedent for future judges, that is seen even today.


What might have been perceived as a gauntlet thrown into the ring by the executive did not deter Justice Sathasivam’s successor, Justice R.M. Lodha, from making bold and unconventional decisions of his own. Most notably, he revived the dormant trend of direct appointments from the Bar to the Bench in the Supreme Court, a practice which was permitted under the Constitution, but seldom attempted. His recommendations were mostly successful, but one was famously not, with the appointment of Gopal Subramaniam being refused by the government. This could have been the Modi government’s first confrontation with the judiciary, and Justice Lodha even later said that he was open to pursuing Mr. Subramaniam’s appointment, but the lawyer himself withdrew his candidature, due to which confrontation was sidestepped. Justice Lodha became a household name for his report on reforms in the Board of Control for Cricket in India. Ironically his report was subsequently completely diluted by the very Court that had appointed the committee to recommend reforms in the first place.


It was under Justice H.L. Dattu, who followed Justice Lodha as CJI, that the first major confrontation between the executive and the judiciary took place. The fourth judge’s case, concerning the validity of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, had been referred to a five judge Bench, and heated arguments ensued. The judiciary stood its ground and eventually emerged victorious, and the NJAC Act, an undoubtedly flawed legislation, was struck down. While the collegium is an arbitrary, secretive and undemocratic process of judicial appointment, and communication and transparency in its operations are more than desirable, the design of the NJAC as proposed was not the appropriate solution. However, the Supreme Court could have fixed the flaws in the NJAC Act, perhaps by reading down the provisions to address its shortcomings, but chose not to do so.


After the NJAC judgment, matters were still not settled, and the memorandum of procedure for appointments to the higher judiciary became the centrepiece of the dispute between the executive and the judiciary. The tension continued when Justice T.S. Thakur took over as the CJI. He was the last CJI in the Modi era to have shown some spine in matters of judicial administration and appointments. Besides vociferously highlighting the plight of the overburdened Indian judiciary, in one instance even shedding tears in the Prime Minister’s presence, Justice Thakur assiduously worked at mechanisms of filling up of vacancies, authoring an important judgment in this regard. He set the National Judicial Data Grid rolling, which today connects all levels of the judicial system and provides a surfeit of information to litigants.


But his reform efforts took a controversial turn when he attempted about 20 transfers of judges across High Courts. He was not the first judge to attempt such large-scale transfers; Justice Venkatachaliah and Justice S.H. Kapadia had tried this too, but their motivations for the transfers were not always unambiguous, and their experiments arguably failed, with many transferred judges being repatriated. Legal scholars and even former judges have lamented that such transfers are akin to treating judges like civil servants, and are a grave threat to the independence and overall integrity of the judiciary. Some of Justice Thakur’s transfer orders were evidently bad calls, and were reversed soon enough.


Unfortunately, transfers continue till date, many being arbitrary and unjustified, and following no documented policy. Notwithstanding his swipes at controversy, Justice Thakur was also the last Chief Justice to really stand up to the government. Up until here, the Supreme Court had stood its ground while confronting the executive. After this, things changed completely.


India’s first CJI from the Sikh community, Justice J.S. Khehar, had a short tenure of less than eight months, in which he was party to many landmark judgments, including the Right to Privacy and Triple Talaq judgments. Justice Khehar’s term also revived debates on the lack of transparency and fairness in managing the roster in the Supreme Court, an issue that spanned the tenures of multiple CJIs thereafter.


Certain unproven allegations in a suicide note by Kalikho Pul, a former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, directed at multiple judges, including Justice Khehar himself, came to the Court’s attention. Without dwelling on the veracity of the allegations, the procedure Justice Khehar followed was without precedent and also without propriety. The Supreme Court, in its own decision in Veeraswami, had said that criminal proceedings against someone in the higher judiciary could only be initiated in consultation with the CJI. Further, if allegations were made against the CJI directly, permission may have to be sought from other Supreme Court judges. Mr. Pul’s wife wrote to Justice Khehar seeking permission to file an FIR against the judges mentioned in the note. Despite being named himself, the CJI, of his own accord, flouting all concerns of conflict of interest, chose to list the letter as a writ petition (converting an administrative question into a judicial one). Critically, this demonstrated a complete disregard of basic principles of natural justice, and set an example for others to follow.


The other controversial development during Justice Khehar’s tenure was the conviction and subsequent imprisonment of a High Court judge, Justice C.S. Karnan, for contempt of court. Besides criticising the Court’s exercise of its disciplinary powers and contempt jurisdiction, many also deemed the decision unconstitutional for overlooking Parliament’s exclusive privilege to remove a member of the higher judiciary in an act. The root problem of judicial appointments was ignored, as also the question of how certain judges could enter the higher judiciary without adequate scrutiny.


The next CJI was Justice Dipak Misra, whose tenure is remembered for the unprecedented press conference held by his four fellow judges, condemning the CJI’s internal administrative decisions, specifically that court conventions of bench strength and bench composition in the allocation of cases were not being followed, and that the CJI had selectively assigned, without any rational basis, important cases to preferential benches. The trigger was the Brijgopal Harkishan Loya case, the conspiracy theories surrounding his death, and the decision to allocate the matter to a certain Bench contrary to roster and convention.


The issue of the master of roster and conflict of interest also emerged. A Bench led by Justice Misra was hearing a murky CBI case pertaining to bribery around admissions in a debarred medical college, which also involved allegations of attempts to bribe sitting High Court and Supreme Court judges. Separate petitions sought a court-regulated investigation in this case, with a request to list this matter before a Bench other than the CJI’s Bench, for reasons of conflict of interest. Instead of sitting out the case, as propriety and common sense would have demanded, Justice Misra chose to hear these petitions himself, even adjudicating on the scope of the powers of the CJI himself. Ultimately, after lots of twists and turns, the petitions were dismissed with heavy fines, but the debate around conflict of interest within the judiciary was only getting more accentuated.


He was also the first CJI against whom an impeachment motion was proceeded against, although it was eventually quashed by the Rajya Sabha. Despite these controversies, Justice Misra managed to set up the maximum number of constitutional benches as CJI and strove constantly to achieve a balance between adjudication and disposal.


The next CJI, Justice Ranjan Gogoi, also had a controversial tenure. He had been a party to the press conference earlier, and had famously also encouraged “noisy judges” to be more questioning of the system. However, the absolute disregard of conflict of interest took its most prominent turn in his tenure, when Justice Gogoi sat in the hearing (although he did not sign the order) of a sexual harassment complaint made by an employee of the Supreme Court against himself. All principles of natural justice were broken in handling this complaint. Besides the CJI himself constituting a committee for examining the charges, the committee report exonerating the CJI was also not disclosed to the complainant, let alone the public at large. Her grievance was also about unfair dismissal and victimisation, which seems to have not been addressed by the committee. Much later, she was reinstated in service under the next CJI Bobde.


Justice Gogoi was also obsessed with secrecy, and routinely asked for information to be submitted to the court in ‘sealed covers’ (this has since been discontinued with Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s order denouncing the practice.) This was employed in cases such as the Assam’s National Register of Citizens (NRC) matter, the Rafale dispute, the electoral bonds issue, and so on. In the NRC case, the manner in which the judiciary took over the executive’s role, leaving the citizenship rights of millions under cloud, led commentators to term this as the rise of the ‘executive court’. His treatment of habeas corpus petitions filed from Jammu & Kashmir in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370 prompted an eminent lawyer to say that the “Gogoi Court has, at reckless speed, run a coach-and-four through the centuries-old established law on habeas corpus.” In his tenure, the practice of what some legal scholars describe as ‘judicial evasion’ also grew; the Supreme Court would avoid hearing certain cases altogether, especially those of utmost importance to the nation, such as the electoral bonds case, the Citizenship Amendment Act case, the abrogation of Article 370, etc., or would sit on such cases without passing any orders of consequence.


Justice Gogoi also accepted an appointment as a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) soon after retirement, and fears expressed at the time of Justice Sathasivam’s post retirement appointment resurfaced of increased executive and legislative interference in matters of the judiciary. Already, there was a growing deferential attitude in the judiciary towards the executive. Disturbingly, at about the same time, there was also a tendency towards sycophancy that started among Supreme Court judges, with Justice Arun Mishra and Justice M.R. Shah showering praises on the Prime Minister publicly. Justice Gogoi’s Bench concluded the long-standing Ayodhya dispute, but there appears to be no end in sight to end communal strife, with Gyanvapi, and perhaps even Kashi and Mathura to follow.


Justice Gogoi was followed by Justice Sharad A. Bobde as CJI, who had the longest tenure in the Modi era, clocking in a little over one year and five months. While that gave an opportunity to boldly experiment with technology in the judiciary, it also led to greater subservience on the part of the judiciary towards the government. The practice of judicial evasion that began under Justice Gogoi continued in his term. This period also saw the Court give preferential treatment to certain matters, for example, in the bail matters of journalists Siddique Kappan versus Arnab Goswami.


CJI Bobde’s Bench, in an unprecedented order, also stayed the controversial farm laws, and appointed a committee to examine the issue comprising individuals who had already publicly supported the laws themselves. Justice Bobde will also be remembered for his vocal displeasure of the use of Article 32 petitions as a means of approaching the court, as also attempting to take away the right to adjudicate on COVID cases from High Courts.


Despite these controversial decisions, Justice Bobde made an attempt at judicial reform by issuing guidelines on the appointment of ad-hoc judges to tackle judicial pendency. It is also notable that during his term, not a single appointment was made to the Supreme Court. Justice Bobde was reluctant to recommend Justice Akil Kureshi to the Supreme Court, a respected senior High Court Chief Justice, who had incidentally also issued an order against a high functionary of the government. On the other hand, Justice Nariman was insistent on recommending his name. This led to a standoff within the collegium, and speaks volumes about the so-called independence of the collegium.


The latest Chief Justice to have completed his term in office in this period is Justice N.V. Ramana. Justice Ramana has been the most publicly visible face of the Supreme Court in the modern era. Besides delivering speeches and engaging with the public at large across the country, Justice Ramana has also brought back some of the old glory of the Supreme Court. The institution seems to be the ‘sentinel on the qui vive’ once again. Public confidence in the judiciary has also improved with certain bail orders and stays (e.g., sedition), and the Pegasus inquiry.


That said, his tenure has also seen some judgments from his associate judges seriously undermining civil liberties. The decision on the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which was in the same vein as the Court’s earlier decision in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (the Watali case), had the effect of virtually detaining people for an indefinite period, comparable only to the ADM Jabalpur case.


It is pertinent to note that Justice Ramana also filled up all posts in the Supreme Court and made a significantly large number of appointments in the higher judiciary, including appointing many women judges, in a direct move to improve the diversity in the system. Unfortunately, the practice of judicial evasion continued in Justice Ramana’s term, and no constitutional Benches were formed, and neither were important matters taken up.


The future


The Supreme Court today is headed by the 49th Chief Justice of India, Justice U.U. Lalit, who will have a tenure of less than three months. Although it is too early to make any substantial remarks on his tenure, in the short time that he has been in office, Justice Lalit has already shown that the registry can be reformed through improving processes of filing and listing of cases. He has also taken initiatives in the formation of benches and certain initial orders that he has given, e.g., in the Kappan and Setalvad cases, granting bail to individuals where the original indictment itself was without basis. All these developments hold promise for the judiciary, and there is hope that the Supreme Court will live up to its functions of being the true custodian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental rights that it was once meant to be.


In the coming decades, the Supreme Court will continue to face challenges from multiple fronts, particularly the executive. It will also have newer responsibilities of strengthening the Indian judiciary, especially the lower courts, which seem to have faltered in recent times in many respects. A dynamic and thoughtful leadership, supported by puisne judges, should be able to ensure that these challenges and responsibilities are met appropriately. The Supreme Court of India, as also the office of the CJI, will continue to evolve, but hopefully, they will do so in the right direction.



















From Lodha to Ramana: the Chief Justices of the Modi era


In its most essential form, the Indian Supreme Court is the custodian of the Constitution of India. In this role, its primary responsibility is to ensure that the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution are not diluted, eroded, or otherwise impinged upon by the state. It might have begun its existence as a passive court, but over the decades, it has become what I believe to be the most powerful court among its peers in the world.


This superior status manifests itself in at least three ways. Firstly, through its decision in Keshavananda Bharati, the Court assumed the power of judicial review over constitutional amendments. Secondly, through multiple decisions, it assumed the power of judicial appointments to itself and High Courts. And thirdly, it expanded the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution through guaranteeing citizens unique and wide ranging protections, and ensuring the right to approach courts through public interest litigation.


At its helm sits the Chief Justice of India, or the CJI. The duties and responsibilities that come with the office of the CJI are unmatched by any other role in the country. In theory, at least, the CJI must exhibit judicial and administrative talent of an unusually high order. A sample of the responsibilities of the office include selecting judges for appointment to the higher judiciary, deciding the number and composition of benches to adjudicate on different kinds of cases, besides performing normal judicial duties. As George H. Gadbois puts it, the Chief Justice should be ‘a competent administrator, a shrewd judge of men and personalities, and a towering personality himself’.


But, by dint of circumstance, and to some degree by choice, the Indian judiciary evolved to follow the seniority convention in appointing the Chief Justice of India. As a result, while the persons who eventually become Chief Justice may not have been appointed for exhibiting certain qualities, they are compelled to develop these skills on the job, and some have done so with aplomb, e.g., Justice Subba Rao, Justice Venkatachaliah, and Justice J.S. Verma. However, an unfortunate fallout of the seniority convention is that Chief Justices tend to have very short tenures in office. Over 75 years, the Indian Supreme Court has already had 49 Chief Justices. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, in the 1980s, had an exceptionally long tenure of over seven years, while at the other extreme, Justice K.N. Singh occupied the office for a mere 17 days.


Three periods


This large number of Chief Justices provides for an interesting data set to study the evolution of the office, and the relationship of the judiciary with the executive, which can be roughly classified into the following eras. From 1950 to 1971, the Chief Justice had complete authority over judicial appointments, and the recommendation of the Chief Justice would always be followed, even to the extent of powers of a veto.


Between 1971 and 1993, strong single party governments occupied the Centre, and the executive insisted on appointing ‘committed judges’ to the Supreme Court, in a clear attempt at court packing. Multiple supersessions took place, with the executive exercising prerogative in appointing Chief Justices, and the seniority convention was openly flouted. The shocker came with the decision in the first judges’ case in 1981 (SP Gupta), where it was held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would not be binding on the government.


With the second judge’s case in 1993, and around when Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah took over as the CJI, the trend reversed and the judiciary practically wrested the power of appointments back from the executive. Judicial primacy and the collegium’s creation happened in this period, and while the collegium has since acquired considerable notoriety for being arbitrary and undemocratic, it still occupies the field today.


When we examine the evolution of the Indian Supreme Court and the office of the CJI, it is a classic example of a constant shifting and rebalancing of power between the judiciary and the executive. When the executive was powerful, the judiciary practically succumbed to the executive’s control. However, when relatively weaker coalition governments were elected, the judiciary restored powers to itself.


This rebalancing is playing out again now. Since 2014, the executive is once again a single party majority under the Narendra Modi-led BJP government. Consequently, the judiciary’s powers are weaker than before, and the executive is back in control. We see a rise in autocratic tendencies of the executive, through the slow destruction of democratic institutions, the misuse of investigating agencies, communal polarisation, and a gradual chipping away at constitutional protections available to citizens, all of which a weak judiciary is unable or disinclined to tackle.


From 2014 to 2022, the eight years the Modi government has been in power, eight individuals have occupied the office of the CJI, from Justice R.M. Lodha as the 41st Chief Justice to Justice N.V. Ramana as the 48th. This article attempts to examine how their tenures have contributed to the evolution of the Court and the office of the CJI.


The CJIs of the Modi era


Immediately before the Modi government first came to power in 2014, the CJI was Justice P. Sathasivam, who, rather unfortunately, chose to accept the Governorship of Kerala almost immediately after he demitted office. This unusual and arguably irregular appointment was made without an appropriate cooling period, and went against the BJP government’s own policy, with Arun Jaitley having openly proclaimed that giving jobs to judges upon retirement would help governments influence courts. This also set a dangerous precedent for future judges, that is seen even today.


What might have been perceived as a gauntlet thrown into the ring by the executive did not deter Justice Sathasivam’s successor, Justice R.M. Lodha, from making bold and unconventional decisions of his own. Most notably, he revived the dormant trend of direct appointments from the Bar to the Bench in the Supreme Court, a practice which was permitted under the Constitution, but seldom attempted. His recommendations were mostly successful, but one was famously not, with the appointment of Gopal Subramaniam being refused by the government. This could have been the Modi government’s first confrontation with the judiciary, and Justice Lodha even later said that he was open to pursuing Mr. Subramaniam’s appointment, but the lawyer himself withdrew his candidature, due to which confrontation was sidestepped. Justice Lodha became a household name for his report on reforms in the Board of Control for Cricket in India. Ironically his report was subsequently completely diluted by the very Court that had appointed the committee to recommend reforms in the first place.


It was under Justice H.L. Dattu, who followed Justice Lodha as CJI, that the first major confrontation between the executive and the judiciary took place. The fourth judge’s case, concerning the validity of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, had been referred to a five judge Bench, and heated arguments ensued. The judiciary stood its ground and eventually emerged victorious, and the NJAC Act, an undoubtedly flawed legislation, was struck down. While the collegium is an arbitrary, secretive and undemocratic process of judicial appointment, and communication and transparency in its operations are more than desirable, the design of the NJAC as proposed was not the appropriate solution. However, the Supreme Court could have fixed the flaws in the NJAC Act, perhaps by reading down the provisions to address its shortcomings, but chose not to do so.


After the NJAC judgment, matters were still not settled, and the memorandum of procedure for appointments to the higher judiciary became the centrepiece of the dispute between the executive and the judiciary. The tension continued when Justice T.S. Thakur took over as the CJI. He was the last CJI in the Modi era to have shown some spine in matters of judicial administration and appointments. Besides vociferously highlighting the plight of the overburdened Indian judiciary, in one instance even shedding tears in the Prime Minister’s presence, Justice Thakur assiduously worked at mechanisms of filling up of vacancies, authoring an important judgment in this regard. He set the National Judicial Data Grid rolling, which today connects all levels of the judicial system and provides a surfeit of information to litigants.


But his reform efforts took a controversial turn when he attempted about 20 transfers of judges across High Courts. He was not the first judge to attempt such large-scale transfers; Justice Venkatachaliah and Justice S.H. Kapadia had tried this too, but their motivations for the transfers were not always unambiguous, and their experiments arguably failed, with many transferred judges being repatriated. Legal scholars and even former judges have lamented that such transfers are akin to treating judges like civil servants, and are a grave threat to the independence and overall integrity of the judiciary. Some of Justice Thakur’s transfer orders were evidently bad calls, and were reversed soon enough.


Unfortunately, transfers continue till date, many being arbitrary and unjustified, and following no documented policy. Notwithstanding his swipes at controversy, Justice Thakur was also the last Chief Justice to really stand up to the government. Up until here, the Supreme Court had stood its ground while confronting the executive. After this, things changed completely.


India’s first CJI from the Sikh community, Justice J.S. Khehar, had a short tenure of less than eight months, in which he was party to many landmark judgments, including the Right to Privacy and Triple Talaq judgments. Justice Khehar’s term also revived debates on the lack of transparency and fairness in managing the roster in the Supreme Court, an issue that spanned the tenures of multiple CJIs thereafter.


Certain unproven allegations in a suicide note by Kalikho Pul, a former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, directed at multiple judges, including Justice Khehar himself, came to the Court’s attention. Without dwelling on the veracity of the allegations, the procedure Justice Khehar followed was without precedent and also without propriety. The Supreme Court, in its own decision in Veeraswami, had said that criminal proceedings against someone in the higher judiciary could only be initiated in consultation with the CJI. Further, if allegations were made against the CJI directly, permission may have to be sought from other Supreme Court judges. Mr. Pul’s wife wrote to Justice Khehar seeking permission to file an FIR against the judges mentioned in the note. Despite being named himself, the CJI, of his own accord, flouting all concerns of conflict of interest, chose to list the letter as a writ petition (converting an administrative question into a judicial one). Critically, this demonstrated a complete disregard of basic principles of natural justice, and set an example for others to follow.


The other controversial development during Justice Khehar’s tenure was the conviction and subsequent imprisonment of a High Court judge, Justice C.S. Karnan, for contempt of court. Besides criticising the Court’s exercise of its disciplinary powers and contempt jurisdiction, many also deemed the decision unconstitutional for overlooking Parliament’s exclusive privilege to remove a member of the higher judiciary in an act. The root problem of judicial appointments was ignored, as also the question of how certain judges could enter the higher judiciary without adequate scrutiny.


The next CJI was Justice Dipak Misra, whose tenure is remembered for the unprecedented press conference held by his four fellow judges, condemning the CJI’s internal administrative decisions, specifically that court conventions of bench strength and bench composition in the allocation of cases were not being followed, and that the CJI had selectively assigned, without any rational basis, important cases to preferential benches. The trigger was the Brijgopal Harkishan Loya case, the conspiracy theories surrounding his death, and the decision to allocate the matter to a certain Bench contrary to roster and convention.


The issue of the master of roster and conflict of interest also emerged. A Bench led by Justice Misra was hearing a murky CBI case pertaining to bribery around admissions in a debarred medical college, which also involved allegations of attempts to bribe sitting High Court and Supreme Court judges. Separate petitions sought a court-regulated investigation in this case, with a request to list this matter before a Bench other than the CJI’s Bench, for reasons of conflict of interest. Instead of sitting out the case, as propriety and common sense would have demanded, Justice Misra chose to hear these petitions himself, even adjudicating on the scope of the powers of the CJI himself. Ultimately, after lots of twists and turns, the petitions were dismissed with heavy fines, but the debate around conflict of interest within the judiciary was only getting more accentuated.


He was also the first CJI against whom an impeachment motion was proceeded against, although it was eventually quashed by the Rajya Sabha. Despite these controversies, Justice Misra managed to set up the maximum number of constitutional benches as CJI and strove constantly to achieve a balance between adjudication and disposal.


The next CJI, Justice Ranjan Gogoi, also had a controversial tenure. He had been a party to the press conference earlier, and had famously also encouraged “noisy judges” to be more questioning of the system. However, the absolute disregard of conflict of interest took its most prominent turn in his tenure, when Justice Gogoi sat in the hearing (although he did not sign the order) of a sexual harassment complaint made by an employee of the Supreme Court against himself. All principles of natural justice were broken in handling this complaint. Besides the CJI himself constituting a committee for examining the charges, the committee report exonerating the CJI was also not disclosed to the complainant, let alone the public at large. Her grievance was also about unfair dismissal and victimisation, which seems to have not been addressed by the committee. Much later, she was reinstated in service under the next CJI Bobde.


Justice Gogoi was also obsessed with secrecy, and routinely asked for information to be submitted to the court in ‘sealed covers’ (this has since been discontinued with Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s order denouncing the practice.) This was employed in cases such as the Assam’s National Register of Citizens (NRC) matter, the Rafale dispute, the electoral bonds issue, and so on. In the NRC case, the manner in which the judiciary took over the executive’s role, leaving the citizenship rights of millions under cloud, led commentators to term this as the rise of the ‘executive court’. His treatment of habeas corpus petitions filed from Jammu & Kashmir in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370 prompted an eminent lawyer to say that the “Gogoi Court has, at reckless speed, run a coach-and-four through the centuries-old established law on habeas corpus.” In his tenure, the practice of what some legal scholars describe as ‘judicial evasion’ also grew; the Supreme Court would avoid hearing certain cases altogether, especially those of utmost importance to the nation, such as the electoral bonds case, the Citizenship Amendment Act case, the abrogation of Article 370, etc., or would sit on such cases without passing any orders of consequence.


Justice Gogoi also accepted an appointment as a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) soon after retirement, and fears expressed at the time of Justice Sathasivam’s post retirement appointment resurfaced of increased executive and legislative interference in matters of the judiciary. Already, there was a growing deferential attitude in the judiciary towards the executive. Disturbingly, at about the same time, there was also a tendency towards sycophancy that started among Supreme Court judges, with Justice Arun Mishra and Justice M.R. Shah showering praises on the Prime Minister publicly. Justice Gogoi’s Bench concluded the long-standing Ayodhya dispute, but there appears to be no end in sight to end communal strife, with Gyanvapi, and perhaps even Kashi and Mathura to follow.


Justice Gogoi was followed by Justice Sharad A. Bobde as CJI, who had the longest tenure in the Modi era, clocking in a little over one year and five months. While that gave an opportunity to boldly experiment with technology in the judiciary, it also led to greater subservience on the part of the judiciary towards the government. The practice of judicial evasion that began under Justice Gogoi continued in his term. This period also saw the Court give preferential treatment to certain matters, for example, in the bail matters of journalists Siddique Kappan versus Arnab Goswami.


CJI Bobde’s Bench, in an unprecedented order, also stayed the controversial farm laws, and appointed a committee to examine the issue comprising individuals who had already publicly supported the laws themselves. Justice Bobde will also be remembered for his vocal displeasure of the use of Article 32 petitions as a means of approaching the court, as also attempting to take away the right to adjudicate on COVID cases from High Courts.


Despite these controversial decisions, Justice Bobde made an attempt at judicial reform by issuing guidelines on the appointment of ad-hoc judges to tackle judicial pendency. It is also notable that during his term, not a single appointment was made to the Supreme Court. Justice Bobde was reluctant to recommend Justice Akil Kureshi to the Supreme Court, a respected senior High Court Chief Justice, who had incidentally also issued an order against a high functionary of the government. On the other hand, Justice Nariman was insistent on recommending his name. This led to a standoff within the collegium, and speaks volumes about the so-called independence of the collegium.


The latest Chief Justice to have completed his term in office in this period is Justice N.V. Ramana. Justice Ramana has been the most publicly visible face of the Supreme Court in the modern era. Besides delivering speeches and engaging with the public at large across the country, Justice Ramana has also brought back some of the old glory of the Supreme Court. The institution seems to be the ‘sentinel on the qui vive’ once again. Public confidence in the judiciary has also improved with certain bail orders and stays (e.g., sedition), and the Pegasus inquiry.


That said, his tenure has also seen some judgments from his associate judges seriously undermining civil liberties. The decision on the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which was in the same vein as the Court’s earlier decision in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (the Watali case), had the effect of virtually detaining people for an indefinite period, comparable only to the ADM Jabalpur case.


It is pertinent to note that Justice Ramana also filled up all posts in the Supreme Court and made a significantly large number of appointments in the higher judiciary, including appointing many women judges, in a direct move to improve the diversity in the system. Unfortunately, the practice of judicial evasion continued in Justice Ramana’s term, and no constitutional Benches were formed, and neither were important matters taken up.


The future


The Supreme Court today is headed by the 49th Chief Justice of India, Justice U.U. Lalit, who will have a tenure of less than three months. Although it is too early to make any substantial remarks on his tenure, in the short time that he has been in office, Justice Lalit has already shown that the registry can be reformed through improving processes of filing and listing of cases. He has also taken initiatives in the formation of benches and certain initial orders that he has given, e.g., in the Kappan and Setalvad cases, granting bail to individuals where the original indictment itself was without basis. All these developments hold promise for the judiciary, and there is hope that the Supreme Court will live up to its functions of being the true custodian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental rights that it was once meant to be.


In the coming decades, the Supreme Court will continue to face challenges from multiple fronts, particularly the executive. It will also have newer responsibilities of strengthening the Indian judiciary, especially the lower courts, which seem to have faltered in recent times in many respects. A dynamic and thoughtful leadership, supported by puisne judges, should be able to ensure that these challenges and responsibilities are met appropriately. The Supreme Court of India, as also the office of the CJI, will continue to evolve, but hopefully, they will do so in the right direction.




From Lodha to Ramana: the Chief Justices of the Modi era


In its most essential form, the Indian Supreme Court is the custodian of the Constitution of India. In this role, its primary responsibility is to ensure that the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution are not diluted, eroded, or otherwise impinged upon by the state. It might have begun its existence as a passive court, but over the decades, it has become what I believe to be the most powerful court among its peers in the world.


This superior status manifests itself in at least three ways. Firstly, through its decision in Keshavananda Bharati, the Court assumed the power of judicial review over constitutional amendments. Secondly, through multiple decisions, it assumed the power of judicial appointments to itself and High Courts. And thirdly, it expanded the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution through guaranteeing citizens unique and wide ranging protections, and ensuring the right to approach courts through public interest litigation.


At its helm sits the Chief Justice of India, or the CJI. The duties and responsibilities that come with the office of the CJI are unmatched by any other role in the country. In theory, at least, the CJI must exhibit judicial and administrative talent of an unusually high order. A sample of the responsibilities of the office include selecting judges for appointment to the higher judiciary, deciding the number and composition of benches to adjudicate on different kinds of cases, besides performing normal judicial duties. As George H. Gadbois puts it, the Chief Justice should be ‘a competent administrator, a shrewd judge of men and personalities, and a towering personality himself’.


But, by dint of circumstance, and to some degree by choice, the Indian judiciary evolved to follow the seniority convention in appointing the Chief Justice of India. As a result, while the persons who eventually become Chief Justice may not have been appointed for exhibiting certain qualities, they are compelled to develop these skills on the job, and some have done so with aplomb, e.g., Justice Subba Rao, Justice Venkatachaliah, and Justice J.S. Verma. However, an unfortunate fallout of the seniority convention is that Chief Justices tend to have very short tenures in office. Over 75 years, the Indian Supreme Court has already had 49 Chief Justices. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, in the 1980s, had an exceptionally long tenure of over seven years, while at the other extreme, Justice K.N. Singh occupied the office for a mere 17 days.


Three periods


This large number of Chief Justices provides for an interesting data set to study the evolution of the office, and the relationship of the judiciary with the executive, which can be roughly classified into the following eras. From 1950 to 1971, the Chief Justice had complete authority over judicial appointments, and the recommendation of the Chief Justice would always be followed, even to the extent of powers of a veto.


Between 1971 and 1993, strong single party governments occupied the Centre, and the executive insisted on appointing ‘committed judges’ to the Supreme Court, in a clear attempt at court packing. Multiple supersessions took place, with the executive exercising prerogative in appointing Chief Justices, and the seniority convention was openly flouted. The shocker came with the decision in the first judges’ case in 1981 (SP Gupta), where it was held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would not be binding on the government.


With the second judge’s case in 1993, and around when Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah took over as the CJI, the trend reversed and the judiciary practically wrested the power of appointments back from the executive. Judicial primacy and the collegium’s creation happened in this period, and while the collegium has since acquired considerable notoriety for being arbitrary and undemocratic, it still occupies the field today.


When we examine the evolution of the Indian Supreme Court and the office of the CJI, it is a classic example of a constant shifting and rebalancing of power between the judiciary and the executive. When the executive was powerful, the judiciary practically succumbed to the executive’s control. However, when relatively weaker coalition governments were elected, the judiciary restored powers to itself.


This rebalancing is playing out again now. Since 2014, the executive is once again a single party majority under the Narendra Modi-led BJP government. Consequently, the judiciary’s powers are weaker than before, and the executive is back in control. We see a rise in autocratic tendencies of the executive, through the slow destruction of democratic institutions, the misuse of investigating agencies, communal polarisation, and a gradual chipping away at constitutional protections available to citizens, all of which a weak judiciary is unable or disinclined to tackle.


From 2014 to 2022, the eight years the Modi government has been in power, eight individuals have occupied the office of the CJI, from Justice R.M. Lodha as the 41st Chief Justice to Justice N.V. Ramana as the 48th. This article attempts to examine how their tenures have contributed to the evolution of the Court and the office of the CJI.


The CJIs of the Modi era


Immediately before the Modi government first came to power in 2014, the CJI was Justice P. Sathasivam, who, rather unfortunately, chose to accept the Governorship of Kerala almost immediately after he demitted office. This unusual and arguably irregular appointment was made without an appropriate cooling period, and went against the BJP government’s own policy, with Arun Jaitley having openly proclaimed that giving jobs to judges upon retirement would help governments influence courts. This also set a dangerous precedent for future judges, that is seen even today.


What might have been perceived as a gauntlet thrown into the ring by the executive did not deter Justice Sathasivam’s successor, Justice R.M. Lodha, from making bold and unconventional decisions of his own. Most notably, he revived the dormant trend of direct appointments from the Bar to the Bench in the Supreme Court, a practice which was permitted under the Constitution, but seldom attempted. His recommendations were mostly successful, but one was famously not, with the appointment of Gopal Subramaniam being refused by the government. This could have been the Modi government’s first confrontation with the judiciary, and Justice Lodha even later said that he was open to pursuing Mr. Subramaniam’s appointment, but the lawyer himself withdrew his candidature, due to which confrontation was sidestepped. Justice Lodha became a household name for his report on reforms in the Board of Control for Cricket in India. Ironically his report was subsequently completely diluted by the very Court that had appointed the committee to recommend reforms in the first place.


It was under Justice H.L. Dattu, who followed Justice Lodha as CJI, that the first major confrontation between the executive and the judiciary took place. The fourth judge’s case, concerning the validity of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, had been referred to a five judge Bench, and heated arguments ensued. The judiciary stood its ground and eventually emerged victorious, and the NJAC Act, an undoubtedly flawed legislation, was struck down. While the collegium is an arbitrary, secretive and undemocratic process of judicial appointment, and communication and transparency in its operations are more than desirable, the design of the NJAC as proposed was not the appropriate solution. However, the Supreme Court could have fixed the flaws in the NJAC Act, perhaps by reading down the provisions to address its shortcomings, but chose not to do so.


After the NJAC judgment, matters were still not settled, and the memorandum of procedure for appointments to the higher judiciary became the centrepiece of the dispute between the executive and the judiciary. The tension continued when Justice T.S. Thakur took over as the CJI. He was the last CJI in the Modi era to have shown some spine in matters of judicial administration and appointments. Besides vociferously highlighting the plight of the overburdened Indian judiciary, in one instance even shedding tears in the Prime Minister’s presence, Justice Thakur assiduously worked at mechanisms of filling up of vacancies, authoring an important judgment in this regard. He set the National Judicial Data Grid rolling, which today connects all levels of the judicial system and provides a surfeit of information to litigants.


But his reform efforts took a controversial turn when he attempted about 20 transfers of judges across High Courts. He was not the first judge to attempt such large-scale transfers; Justice Venkatachaliah and Justice S.H. Kapadia had tried this too, but their motivations for the transfers were not always unambiguous, and their experiments arguably failed, with many transferred judges being repatriated. Legal scholars and even former judges have lamented that such transfers are akin to treating judges like civil servants, and are a grave threat to the independence and overall integrity of the judiciary. Some of Justice Thakur’s transfer orders were evidently bad calls, and were reversed soon enough.


Unfortunately, transfers continue till date, many being arbitrary and unjustified, and following no documented policy. Notwithstanding his swipes at controversy, Justice Thakur was also the last Chief Justice to really stand up to the government. Up until here, the Supreme Court had stood its ground while confronting the executive. After this, things changed completely.


India’s first CJI from the Sikh community, Justice J.S. Khehar, had a short tenure of less than eight months, in which he was party to many landmark judgments, including the Right to Privacy and Triple Talaq judgments. Justice Khehar’s term also revived debates on the lack of transparency and fairness in managing the roster in the Supreme Court, an issue that spanned the tenures of multiple CJIs thereafter.


Certain unproven allegations in a suicide note by Kalikho Pul, a former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, directed at multiple judges, including Justice Khehar himself, came to the Court’s attention. Without dwelling on the veracity of the allegations, the procedure Justice Khehar followed was without precedent and also without propriety. The Supreme Court, in its own decision in Veeraswami, had said that criminal proceedings against someone in the higher judiciary could only be initiated in consultation with the CJI. Further, if allegations were made against the CJI directly, permission may have to be sought from other Supreme Court judges. Mr. Pul’s wife wrote to Justice Khehar seeking permission to file an FIR against the judges mentioned in the note. Despite being named himself, the CJI, of his own accord, flouting all concerns of conflict of interest, chose to list the letter as a writ petition (converting an administrative question into a judicial one). Critically, this demonstrated a complete disregard of basic principles of natural justice, and set an example for others to follow.


The other controversial development during Justice Khehar’s tenure was the conviction and subsequent imprisonment of a High Court judge, Justice C.S. Karnan, for contempt of court. Besides criticising the Court’s exercise of its disciplinary powers and contempt jurisdiction, many also deemed the decision unconstitutional for overlooking Parliament’s exclusive privilege to remove a member of the higher judiciary in an act. The root problem of judicial appointments was ignored, as also the question of how certain judges could enter the higher judiciary without adequate scrutiny.


The next CJI was Justice Dipak Misra, whose tenure is remembered for the unprecedented press conference held by his four fellow judges, condemning the CJI’s internal administrative decisions, specifically that court conventions of bench strength and bench composition in the allocation of cases were not being followed, and that the CJI had selectively assigned, without any rational basis, important cases to preferential benches. The trigger was the Brijgopal Harkishan Loya case, the conspiracy theories surrounding his death, and the decision to allocate the matter to a certain Bench contrary to roster and convention.


The issue of the master of roster and conflict of interest also emerged. A Bench led by Justice Misra was hearing a murky CBI case pertaining to bribery around admissions in a debarred medical college, which also involved allegations of attempts to bribe sitting High Court and Supreme Court judges. Separate petitions sought a court-regulated investigation in this case, with a request to list this matter before a Bench other than the CJI’s Bench, for reasons of conflict of interest. Instead of sitting out the case, as propriety and common sense would have demanded, Justice Misra chose to hear these petitions himself, even adjudicating on the scope of the powers of the CJI himself. Ultimately, after lots of twists and turns, the petitions were dismissed with heavy fines, but the debate around conflict of interest within the judiciary was only getting more accentuated.


He was also the first CJI against whom an impeachment motion was proceeded against, although it was eventually quashed by the Rajya Sabha. Despite these controversies, Justice Misra managed to set up the maximum number of constitutional benches as CJI and strove constantly to achieve a balance between adjudication and disposal.


The next CJI, Justice Ranjan Gogoi, also had a controversial tenure. He had been a party to the press conference earlier, and had famously also encouraged “noisy judges” to be more questioning of the system. However, the absolute disregard of conflict of interest took its most prominent turn in his tenure, when Justice Gogoi sat in the hearing (although he did not sign the order) of a sexual harassment complaint made by an employee of the Supreme Court against himself. All principles of natural justice were broken in handling this complaint. Besides the CJI himself constituting a committee for examining the charges, the committee report exonerating the CJI was also not disclosed to the complainant, let alone the public at large. Her grievance was also about unfair dismissal and victimisation, which seems to have not been addressed by the committee. Much later, she was reinstated in service under the next CJI Bobde.


Justice Gogoi was also obsessed with secrecy, and routinely asked for information to be submitted to the court in ‘sealed covers’ (this has since been discontinued with Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s order denouncing the practice.) This was employed in cases such as the Assam’s National Register of Citizens (NRC) matter, the Rafale dispute, the electoral bonds issue, and so on. In the NRC case, the manner in which the judiciary took over the executive’s role, leaving the citizenship rights of millions under cloud, led commentators to term this as the rise of the ‘executive court’. His treatment of habeas corpus petitions filed from Jammu & Kashmir in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370 prompted an eminent lawyer to say that the “Gogoi Court has, at reckless speed, run a coach-and-four through the centuries-old established law on habeas corpus.” In his tenure, the practice of what some legal scholars describe as ‘judicial evasion’ also grew; the Supreme Court would avoid hearing certain cases altogether, especially those of utmost importance to the nation, such as the electoral bonds case, the Citizenship Amendment Act case, the abrogation of Article 370, etc., or would sit on such cases without passing any orders of consequence.


Justice Gogoi also accepted an appointment as a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) soon after retirement, and fears expressed at the time of Justice Sathasivam’s post retirement appointment resurfaced of increased executive and legislative interference in matters of the judiciary. Already, there was a growing deferential attitude in the judiciary towards the executive. Disturbingly, at about the same time, there was also a tendency towards sycophancy that started among Supreme Court judges, with Justice Arun Mishra and Justice M.R. Shah showering praises on the Prime Minister publicly. Justice Gogoi’s Bench concluded the long-standing Ayodhya dispute, but there appears to be no end in sight to end communal strife, with Gyanvapi, and perhaps even Kashi and Mathura to follow.


Justice Gogoi was followed by Justice Sharad A. Bobde as CJI, who had the longest tenure in the Modi era, clocking in a little over one year and five months. While that gave an opportunity to boldly experiment with technology in the judiciary, it also led to greater subservience on the part of the judiciary towards the government. The practice of judicial evasion that began under Justice Gogoi continued in his term. This period also saw the Court give preferential treatment to certain matters, for example, in the bail matters of journalists Siddique Kappan versus Arnab Goswami.


CJI Bobde’s Bench, in an unprecedented order, also stayed the controversial farm laws, and appointed a committee to examine the issue comprising individuals who had already publicly supported the laws themselves. Justice Bobde will also be remembered for his vocal displeasure of the use of Article 32 petitions as a means of approaching the court, as also attempting to take away the right to adjudicate on COVID cases from High Courts.


Despite these controversial decisions, Justice Bobde made an attempt at judicial reform by issuing guidelines on the appointment of ad-hoc judges to tackle judicial pendency. It is also notable that during his term, not a single appointment was made to the Supreme Court. Justice Bobde was reluctant to recommend Justice Akil Kureshi to the Supreme Court, a respected senior High Court Chief Justice, who had incidentally also issued an order against a high functionary of the government. On the other hand, Justice Nariman was insistent on recommending his name. This led to a standoff within the collegium, and speaks volumes about the so-called independence of the collegium.


The latest Chief Justice to have completed his term in office in this period is Justice N.V. Ramana. Justice Ramana has been the most publicly visible face of the Supreme Court in the modern era. Besides delivering speeches and engaging with the public at large across the country, Justice Ramana has also brought back some of the old glory of the Supreme Court. The institution seems to be the ‘sentinel on the qui vive’ once again. Public confidence in the judiciary has also improved with certain bail orders and stays (e.g., sedition), and the Pegasus inquiry.


That said, his tenure has also seen some judgments from his associate judges seriously undermining civil liberties. The decision on the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which was in the same vein as the Court’s earlier decision in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (the Watali case), had the effect of virtually detaining people for an indefinite period, comparable only to the ADM Jabalpur case.


It is pertinent to note that Justice Ramana also filled up all posts in the Supreme Court and made a significantly large number of appointments in the higher judiciary, including appointing many women judges, in a direct move to improve the diversity in the system. Unfortunately, the practice of judicial evasion continued in Justice Ramana’s term, and no constitutional Benches were formed, and neither were important matters taken up.


The future


The Supreme Court today is headed by the 49th Chief Justice of India, Justice U.U. Lalit, who will have a tenure of less than three months. Although it is too early to make any substantial remarks on his tenure, in the short time that he has been in office, Justice Lalit has already shown that the registry can be reformed through improving processes of filing and listing of cases. He has also taken initiatives in the formation of benches and certain initial orders that he has given, e.g., in the Kappan and Setalvad cases, granting bail to individuals where the original indictment itself was without basis. All these developments hold promise for the judiciary, and there is hope that the Supreme Court will live up to its functions of being the true custodian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental rights that it was once meant to be.


In the coming decades, the Supreme Court will continue to face challenges from multiple fronts, particularly the executive. It will also have newer responsibilities of strengthening the Indian judiciary, especially the lower courts, which seem to have faltered in recent times in many respects. A dynamic and thoughtful leadership, supported by puisne judges, should be able to ensure that these challenges and responsibilities are met appropriately. The Supreme Court of India, as also the office of the CJI, will continue to evolve, but hopefully, they will do so in the right direction.



































Tuesday, November 23, 2021

Supreme Court to hear Centre’s review petition on SC/ST Act ruling

 Supreme Court to hear Centre’s review petition on SC/ST Act ruling

Krishnadas RajagopalNEW DELHI, APRIL 03, 2018 11:11 IST

UPDATED: APRIL 03, 2018 14:26 IST

SHARE ARTICLEPRINTA A A


A view of the Supreme Court in New Delhi.   | Photo Credit: Shiv Kumar Pushpakar


Attorney General K.K. Venugopal sought an urgent hearing of the review plea.


A Supreme Court Bench of Justices A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit is scheduled to hear on Tuesday the government's plea to review their March 20 judgment that said the law to protect Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from caste atrocities was being misused as a means for “blackmail”.


As agitations against the judgment claimed several lives across the country, Attorney General K.K. Venugopal made an urgent mention first before a Bench led by Justice Goel to take up the government's review petition filed on Monday. The government referred to the violent Dalit protests on Monday and sought an urgent hearing of the review petition.


Justice Goel asked Mr. Venugopal to mention before the Chief Justice of India (CJI) to constitute a Bench and fix a hearing.


The government's battery of lawyers, led by Mr. Venugopal, immediately went to the CJI's court to again mention the issue.



'Ruling should not be stalled merely because of agitations'

Senior advocate Amrendra Sharan, who was amicus curiae in the case, which led to the March 20 judgment, protested saying that an apex court judgment should not be stalled merely because of agitations and it was the government's duty to restore law and order.



ALSO READ

Up in arms: Members of Dalit organisations blocking a train in Nagpur on Monday.

9 dead as Dalit protests over SC/ST Act rock north India


 

The Chief Justice finally agreed to constitute a Bench of Justices Goel and Lalit and fixed the review petition to be heard before it in open court at 2 p.m. on Tuesday.


“The judgment affects a substantial portion of the population of India being members of the SC/ST and is contrary to the legislative policy of Parliament,” the government has said.


The 89-page verdict by a Bench of Justices Goel and Lalit read down Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 to allow accused persons under the Act to apply for anticipatory bail. Section 18 barred persons accused of causing casteist injury and insult to Dalits from seeking anticipatory bail.


Secondly, the judgment directed that an FIR should be registered only after a “preliminary enquiry” was held by a Deputy Superintendent of Police to check if a complaint is “frivolous”. Any deviation from the directions would automatically lead to the contempt of the Supreme Court, the Bench had warned.


'Easier for accused to get away'

In its review petition, the Centre said the court had no business to dilute the Act by laying down such guidelines and make it easier for accused persons to escape arrest.


“In the given situation of continuing offences of atrocities against members of SC/ST, it would be more significant and meaningful to affirm the reliance and trust of SC/ST on the statute and not make it easier for the accused to get away from arrest by imposing a preliminary enquiry,” the Centre said.


Instead of being misused, the Act is weakly implemented, the government argued.


Objecting to the court's reasoning that non-availability of anticipatory bail was violative of Article 21 (fundamental right to personal liberty), the government said "while it is important to protect the rights of the accused under Article 21, it would deserve to be considered that the protection of Article 21 as well as Article 17 [abolition of untouchability] is equally available to the members of the SC/ST. The immense pain and injury caused on the commission of offence against SC/ST is the worst form of violation of Article 21 requiring complete and strict implementation of the provisions of the Act".


An accused on anticipatory bail would use his liberty to terrorise his victims and prevent proper investigation. Section 18 of the Act is its “backbone” as it enforces an inherent deterrence and instills a sense of protection amongst members of the SC/STs.

Potential of misuse of an Act cannot be a “valid, justifiable or permissible ground” for diluting its stringent provisions of the Act. If that's the case, the entire criminal law would be rendered toothless, the government argued.


The government reminded the court that the “constitutional goal of equality for all citizens of this country can be achieved only when the rights of the SC/STs are protected”.

Sunday, November 21, 2021

Dr Ambedkar’s Last Speech In The Constituent Assembly On Adoption Of The Constitution

 

Dr Ambedkar’s Last Speech In The Constituent Assembly On Adoption Of The Constitution


The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Sir, looking back on the work of the Constituent Assembly it will now be two years, eleven months and seventeen days since it first met on the 9th of December 1946. During this period the Constituent Assembly has altogether held eleven sessions. Out of these eleven sessions, the first six were spent in passing the ejectives Resolution and the consideration of the Reports of Committees on Fundamental Rights, on Union Constitution, on Union Powers, on Provincial Constitution, on Minorities and on the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes. The seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and the eleventh sessions were devoted to the consideration of the Draft Constitution. These eleven sessions of the Constituent Assembly have consumed 165 days. Out of these, the Assembly spent 114 days for the consideration of the Draft Constitution.

Coming to the Drafting Committee, it was elected by the Constituent Assembly on 29th August 1947. It held its first meeting on 30th August. Since August 30th it sat for 141 days during which it was engaged in the preparation of the Draft Constitution. The Draft Constitution as prepared by the Constitutional Adviser as a text for the Draft Committee to work upon consisted of 243 articles and 13 Schedules. The first Draft Constitution as presented by the Drafting Committee to the Constituent Assembly contained 315 articles and 8 Schedules. At the end of the consideration stage, the number of articles in the Draft Constitution increased to 386. In its final form, the Draft Constitution contains 395 articles and 8 Schedules. The total number of amendments to the Draft Constitution tabled was approximately 7,635. Of them, the total number of amendments actually moved in the House was 2,473.

I mention these facts because at one stage it was being said that the Assembly had taken too long a time to finish its work, that it was going on leisurely and wasting the public money. It was said to be a case of Nero fiddling while Rome was burning. Is there any justification for this complaint? Let us note the time the consumed by Constituent Assemblies in other countries appointed for framing their Constitutions. To take a few illustrations, the American Convention met on May 25th 1787 and completed its work on September 17, 1787 i.e., within four months. The Constitutional Convention of Canada met on the 10th October 1864 and the Constitution was passed into law in March 1867 involving a period of two years and five months. The Australian Constitutional Convention assembled in March 1891 and the Constitution became law on the 9th July 1900, consuming a period of nine years. The South African Convention met in October, 1908 and the Constitution became law on the 20th September 1909 involving one year’s labour. It is true that we have taken more time than what the American or South African Conventions did. But we have not taken more time than the Canadian Convention and much less than the Australian Convention. In making comparisons on the basis of time consumed, two things must be remembered. One is that the Constitutions of America, Canada, South Africa and Australia are much smaller than ours. Our Constitution as I said contains 395 articles while the American has just seven articles, the first four of which are divided into sections which total up to 21, the Canadian has 147, Australian 128 and South African 153 sections. The second thing to be remembered is that the makers of the Constitutions of America, Canada, Australia and South Africa did not have to face the problem of amendments. They were passed as moved. On the other hand, this Constituent Assembly had to deal with as many as 2.473 amendments. Having regard to these facts the charge of dilatoriness seems to me quite unfounded and this Assembly may well congratulate itself for having accomplished so formidable a task in so short a time.

Turning to the quality of the work done by the Drafting Committee, Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed felt it his duty to condemn it outright. In his opinion, the work done by the Drafting Committee is not only not worthy of commendation, but is positively below par. Everybody has a right to have his opinion about the work done by the Drafting Committee and Mr. Naziruddin is welcome to have his own. Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed thinks he is a man of greater talents than any member of the Drafting Committee. The drafting Committee does not wish to challenge his claim, on the other hand. The Drafting Committee would have welcomed him in their midst if the Assembly had thought him worthy of being appointed to it. If he had no place in the making of the Constitution it is certainly not the fault of the Drafting Committee.

Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed has coined a new name for the Drafting Committee evidently to show his contempt for it. He calls it a Drifting committee. Mr. Naziruddin must no doubt be pleased with his hit. But he evidently does not know that there is a difference between drift without mastery and drift with mastery. If the Drafting Committee was drifting, it was’ never without mastery over the situation. It was not merely angling with the off chance of catching a fish. It was searching in known waters to find the fish it was after. To be in search of something better is not the same as drifting. Although Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed did not mean it as a compliment to the Drafting Committee, I take it as a compliment to the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee would have been guilty of gross dereliction of duty and of a false sense of dignity if it had not shown the honesty and the courage to withdraw the amendments which it thought faulty and substitute what it thought was better. If it is a mistake, I am glad that the Drafting Committee did not fight shy of admitting such mistakes and coming forward to correct them.

I am glad to find that with the exception of a solitary member, there is a general consensus of appreciation from the members of the Constituent Assembly of the work done by the Drafting Committee. I am sure the Drafting Committee feels happy to find this spontaneous recognition of its
labours expressed in such generous terms. As to the compliments that have been showered upon me both by the members of the Assembly as well as by my colleagues of the Drafting Committee I feel so overwhelmed that I cannot find adequate words to express fully my gratitude to them. I came into the Constituent Assembly with no greater aspiration than to safeguard the interests of the Scheduled Castes. I had not the remotest idea that I would be called upon to undertake more responsible functions. I was
therefore greatly surprised when the Assembly elected me to the Drafting Committee. I was more than surprised when the Drafting Committee elected me to be its Chairman. There were in the Drafting Committee men bigger, better and more competent than myself such as my friend Sir Alladi Krishnas Wami Ayyar. I am grateful to the Constituent Assembly and the Drafting Committee for reposing in me so much trust and confidence and to have chosen me as their instrument and given me this opportunity of serving the country. (Cheers.)

The credit that is given to me does not really belong to me. It belongs partly to Sir B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly who prepared a rough draft of the Constitution for the consideration of the Drafting Committee. A part of the credit must go to the members of the Drafting Committee who, as I have said, have sat for 141 days and without whose ingenuity of devise new formulae and capacity to tolerate and to accommodate different points of view, the task of framing the Constitution could not have come to so successful a conclusion. Much greater, share of the credit must go to Mr. S.N. Mukherjee, the Chief Draftsman of the constitution. His ability to put the most intricate proposals in the simplest and clearest legal form can rarely be equalled, nor his capacity for hard work. “He has been as an acquisition to the Assembly. Without his help, this Assembly would have taken many more years to finalise the Constitution. I must not omit to mention the members of the staff working under Mr. Mukherjee. For, I know how hard they have worked and how long they have toiled sometimes even beyond midnight. I want to thank them all for their effort and their cooperation. (Cheers.)

The task of the Drafting Committee would have been a very difficult one if this Constituent Assembly has been merely a motely crowd, a tessellated pavement without cement, a black stone here and a white stone there is which each member or each group was a law unto itself. There would have been nothing but chaos. This possibility of chaos was reduced to nil by the existence of the Congress Party inside the Assembly which brought into its proceedings a sense of order and discipline. It is because of the discipline of the Congress Party that the Drafting Committee was able to pilot the Constitution in the Assembly with the sure knowledge as to the fate of each article and each amendment. The Congress Party is, therefore, entitled to all the credit for the smooth sailing of the Draft Constitution in the Assembly.

The proceedings of this Constituent Assembly would have been very dull if all members had yielded to the rule of party discipline. Party discipline, in all its rigidity, would have converted this Assembly into a
gathering of yes’ men. Fortunately, there were rebels. They were Mr. Kamath, Dr. PS. Deshmukh, Mr. Sidhva, Prof. Saxena & Pandit Thakur, Das Bhargava along with I must mention Prof. K.T Shah and Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru. The points they raised were mostly ideological. That I was not prepared to accept their suggestions does not diminish the value of their suggestions nor lessen the service they have rendered to the Assembly in enlivening its proceedings. I am grateful to them. But for them, I would not have had the opportunity which I got for expounding the principles underlying the Constitution which was more important than the mere mechanical work of passing the Constitution.

Finally, I must thank you Mr. President for the way in which you have conducted the proceedings of this Assembly. The courtesy and the consideration which you have shown to the Members of the Assembly can never be forgotten by those who have taken part in the proceedings of this Assembly. There were occasions when the amendments of the Drafting Committee were sought to be barred on grounds purely technical in their nature. Those were very anxious moments for me. I am, therefore, especially grateful to you for not permitting legalism to defeat the work of Constitution-making.

As much defence as could be offered to the constitution has been offered by my friends Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and Mr. TT Krishnamachari. I shall not, therefore, enter into the merits of the
Constitution. Because I feel, however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot. The working of a Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of State such as the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs of the State depends are the people and the political parties they will set up as their instruments to carry out their wishes and their politics. Who can say how the people of India and their purposes or will they prefer revolutionary methods of achieving them? If they adopt the revolutionary methods, however good the Constitution may be, it requires no prophet to say that it will fail. It is, therefore, futile to pass any judgement upon the Constitution without reference to the part which the people and their parties are likely to play.

The condemnation of the Constitution largely comes from two quarters, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Why do they condemn the Constitution? Is it because it is really a bad Constitution? I
venture to say no’. The Communist Party want a Constitution based upon the principle of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. They condemn the Constitution because it is based upon parliamentary democracy. The Socialists want two things. The first thing they want is that if they come in power, the Constitution must give them the freedom to nationalize or socialize all private property without payment of compensation. The second thing that the Socialists want is that the Fundamental Rights mentioned in the Constitution must be absolute and without any limitations so that if their Party fails to come into power, they would have the unfettered freedom not merely to criticize, but also to overthrow the State.

These are the main grounds on which the Constitution is being condemned. I do not say that the principle of parliamentary democracy is the only ideal form of political democracy. I do not say that the principle of no acquisition of private property without’ compensation is so sacrosanct that there can be no departure from it. I do not say that Fundamental Rights can never be absolute and the limitations set upon them can never be lifted. What I do say is that the principles embodied in the Constitution are the views of the present generation or if you think this to be an overstatement, I say they are the views of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Why blame the Drafting Committee for embodying them in the Constitution? I say why blame even the Members of the Constituent Assembly? Jefferson, the great American statesman who played so great a part in the making of the American constitution, has expressed some very weighty views which makers of Constitution, can never afford to ignore. In
one place he has said:-

“We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of the majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of another country”.

In another place, he has said:

“The idea that institutions established for the use of the national cannot be touched or modified, even to make them answer their end, because of rights gratuitously supposed in those employed to manage them in the trust for the public, may perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of a monarch, but is most absurd against the nation itself Yet our lawyers and priests generally inculcate this doctrine, and suppose that preceding generations held the earth more freely than we do; had a right to impose laws on us, unalterable by ourselves, and that we, in the like manner, can make laws and impose burdens on future generations, which they will have no right to alter; in fine, that the earth belongs to the dead and not the living”.

I admit that what Jefferson has said is not merely true, but is absolutely true. There can tie no question about it. Had’ the Constituent Assembly departed from this principle laid down by Jefferson it would certainly be liable to blame, even to condemnation. But I ask, has it? Quite the contrary. One has only to examine the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution. The Assembly has not only refrained from putting a seal of finality and infallibility upon this Constitution as in Canada or by making the amendment of the Constitution subject to the fulfilment of extraordinary terms and conditions as in America or Australia, but has provided a most facile procedure for amending the Constitution. I challenge any of the critics of the Constitution to prove that any Constituent Assembly anywhere in the world has, in the circumstances in which this country finds itself, provided such a facile procedure for the amendment of the Constitution. If those who are dissatisfied with the Constitution have only to obtain a 2/3 majority and if they .cannot obtain even a two-thirds majority in the parliament elected on adult franchise in their favour, their dissatisfaction with the Constitution cannot be deemed to be shared by the general public.

There is only one point of constitutional import to which I propose to make a reference. A serious complaint is made on the ground that there is too much of centralization and that the States have been reduced to Municipalities. It is clear that this view is not only an exaggeration, but is also founded on a misunderstanding of what exactly the Constitution contrives to do. As to the relation between the Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of Federalism is that the Legislative and Executive authority is partitioned between-the Centre and the States not by any law to be made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what the Constitution does. The States under our Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre
for their legislative or executive authority. The Centre and the States are co-equal in this matter. It is difficult to see how such a Constitution-can be called centralism. It may be that the Constitution assigns to the Centre too large a field for the operation of its legislative and executive authority than is to be found in any other federal Constitution. It may be that the residuary powers are given to the Centre and not to the States. But these features do not form the essence of federalism. The chief mark of federalism as I said lies in the partition of the legislative and executive authority between the Centre and the Units by the Constitution. This is the principle embodied in our constitution. There can be no mistake about it. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the States have been placed under the Centre. Centre cannot by its own will alter the boundary of that partition. Nor can the Judiciary. For as has been well said:

“Courts may modify, they cannot replace. They can revise earlier interpretations as new arguments, new points of view are presented, they can shift the dividing line in marginal cases, but there are barriers they cannot pass, definite assignments of power they cannot reallocate. They can give a broadening construction of existing powers, but they cannot assign to one authority powers explicitly granted to another”

The first charge of centralization defeating federalism must therefore fall.

The second charge is that the Centre has been given the power to override the States. This charge must be admitted. But before condemning the Constitution for containing such overriding powers, certain considerations must be borne in mind. The first is that these overriding powers do not form the normal feature of the constitution. Their use and operation are expressly confined to emergencies only. The second consideration is: Could we avoid giving overriding powers to the Centre when an emergency has arisen? Those who do not admit the justification for such overriding powers to the Centre even in an emergency, do not seem to have a clear idea of the problem which lies at the root of the matter. The problem is so clearly set out by a writer in that well-known magazine “The Round Table” in its issue of December 1935 that I offer no apology for quoting the following extract from it. Says the writer:

“Political systems are a complex of rights and duties resting ultimately on the question, to whom, or to what authority. Does the citizen owe allegiance? In normal affairs, the question is not present, for the law works smoothly, and a man goes about his business obeying one authority in this set of matters and another authority in that. But in a moment of crisis, a conflict of claims may arise, and it is then apparent that ultimate allegiance cannot be divided. The issue of allegiance cannot be determined in the last resort by a juristic interpretation of statutes. The law must conform to the facts or so much the worse for the law. When all formalism is stripped away, the bare question is what authority commands the residual loyalty of the citizen. Is it the Centre or the Constituent State?”

The solution of this problem depends upon one’s answer to this question which is the crux of the problem. There can be no doubt that in the opinion of the vast majority of the people, the residual loyalty of the citizen in an emergency must be to the Centre and not to the Constituent States. For it is only the Centre which can work for a common end and for the general interests of the country as a whole. Herein lies the justification for giving to all Centre certain overriding powers to be used in an emergency. And after all what is’ the obligation imposed upon the Constituent States by these emergency powers? No more than this – that in an emergency, they should take into consideration alongside their own local interests, the opinions and interests of the nation as a whole. Only those who have, but understood the problem, can complain against it.

Here I could have ended. But my mind is so full of the future of our country that I feel I ought to take this occasion to give expression to some of my reflections thereon. On January 1950, India will be an independent country (Cheers). What would happen to his independence? Will she maintain her independence or will she lose it again? This is the first thought that comes to my mind. It is not that India was never an independent country. The point is that she once lost the independence she had. Will she lose it a second time? It is this thought which makes me most anxious for the future. What perturbs me greatly is the fact -that not only India has once before lost her independence, but -she lost it by the infidelity and treachery of some of her own people. In the invasion of Sind by Mahommed-Bin-Kasim, the military commanders of King Dahar accepted bribes from the agents of Mahommed-Bin-Kasim and refused to fight on the side of their King. It was Jaichand who invited Mahommed Gohri to invade ‘India and fight against Prithvi Raj and promised him the help of himself and the Solanki Kings. When Shivaji was fighting for the liberation of Hindus, the other Maratha noblemen and the Rajput Kings were fighting the battle on the side of Moghul Emperors. When the British were trying to destroy the Sikh Rulers, Gulab Singh, their principal commander sat silent and did not help to save the Sikh Kingdom. In 1857, when a large part of India had declared a war of independence against the British, the Sikhs stood and watched the event as silent spectators.

Will history repeat itself? It is this thought which fills me with anxiety. This anxiety is deepened by the realization of the fact that in addition to our old enemies in the form of castes and creeds .we are going to have many political parties with diverse and opposing political creeds. Will Indian place the country above their creed or will they place creed above country? I do not know. But this much is certain that if the parties place creed above country, our independence will be put in jeopardy a second time and probably be lost forever. This eventuality we must all resolutely guard against. We must be determined to defend our independence with the last drop of our blood.(Cheers.)

On the 26th of January 1950, India would be a democratic country in the sense that India from that day would have a government of the people, by the people and for the people. The same thought comes to my mind. What would happen to her democratic Constitution? Will she be able to maintain it or will she lost it again this is the second thought that comes to my mind and makes me as anxious as the first.

It is not that India did not know what Democracy is. There was a time when India was studded with republics, and even where there were monarchies, they were either elected or limited. They were never absolute. It is not that India did not know Parliaments or Parliamentary Procedure. A study of the Buddhist Bhikshu Sanghas discloses that not only there were Parliaments-for the Sanghas were nothing but Parliaments – but the Sanghas knew and observed all the rules of Parliamentary Procedure known to modern times. They had rules regarding seating arrangements, rules regarding Motions, Resolutions, Quorum, Whip, Counting of Votes, Voting by Ballot, Censure Motion, Regularization, Res Judicata, etc.
Although these rules of Parliamentary Procedure were applied by the Buddha to the meetings of the Sang has, he must have borrowed them from the rules of the Political Assemblies functioning in the country in his time.

This democratic system India lost. Will she lose it a second time? I do not know. But-it is quite possible in a country like India – where democracy from its long disuse must be regarded as something quite new – there is danger of democracy giving place to dictatorship. It is quite possible for this newborn democracy to retain its form but give place to dictatorship in fact. If there is a landslide, the danger of the second possibility of becoming actuality is much greater.

If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what must we do? The first thing in my judgement we must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of revolution. It means that we must abandon the method of civil disobedience, noncooperation and satyagraha. When there was no way left for constitutional methods for achieving economic and social objectives, there was a great deal of justification for unconstitutional methods. But where constitutional methods are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods. These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are abandoned, the better for us.

The second thing we must do is to observe the caution which John Stuart Mill has given to all who are interested in the maintenance of democracy, namely, not “to lay their liberties at the feet of even a great man, or to trust him with power which enable him to subvert their institutions.”There is nothing wrong in being grateful to great men who have rendered life-long services to the country. But there are limits to gratefulness, As has been well said by the Irish Patriot Daniel O’Connell, no man can be grateful at the cost of his honour, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its liberty. This caution is far more necessary in the case of India than in the case of any other country. For in India, Bhakti or what may be called the path of devotion or hero-worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. Bhakti in religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship.

The third thing we must do is not to be content with mere political democracy. We must make our political democracy a social democracy as well. Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognizes liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as
separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality, equality cannot be divorced from liberty. Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. [Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative.] Without fraternity, liberty would produce the supremacy of the few over the many. [Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative.] Without fraternity, liberty and equality could not become a natural course of things. It would require a constable to enforce them. We must begin by acknowledging the fact that there is a complete absence of two things in Indian Society. One of these is equality. On the social plane, we have in India a society based on the principle of graded inequality which we have a society in which there are some who have immense wealth as against many who live in abject poverty. On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics, we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which is Assembly has to laboriously built up.

The second thing we are wanting in is recognition of the principle of fraternity. What does fraternity mean? Fraternity means a sense of common brotherhood of all Indians-if Indians being one people. It is the principle which gives unity and solidarity to social life. It is a difficult thing to achieve. How difficult it is, can be realized ‘from the story related by James Bryce in his volume on American Commonwealth about the United States of America.

The story is- I propose to recount it in the words of Bryce himself that-

“Some years ago the American Protestant Episcopal Church was occupied at its triennial Convention in revising its liturgy. It was thought desirable to introduce among the short sentence prayers a prayer for the whole people, and an eminent New England divine proposed the words ‘O’ Lord, bless our nation’. Accepted one afternoon, on the spur of the moment, the sentence was brought up next day for reconsideration, when so many objections were raised by the laity to the word nation’ as importing too definite a recognition of national unity, that it was dropped, and instead there were adopted the words’ O Lord, bless these United States.”

There was so little solidarity in the U.S.A. at the time when this incident occurred that the people of America did not think that they were a nation. If the people of the United States could not feel that they were a nation, how difficult it is for Indians to think that they are a nation. I remember the days when politically-minded Indians, resented the expression “the people of India.” They preferred the expression the Indian nation.” I am of opinion that in believing that we are a nation, we are cherishing a great delusion. How can people divided into several thousands of castes be a nation? The sooner we realize that we are not as yet a nation in the social and psychological sense of the world, the better for us. For then only we shall realize the necessity of becoming a nation and seriously think of ways and means of realising the goal. The realization of this goal is going to be very difficult – far more difficult than it has been in the United States. The United States has no caste problem. In India there are castes. The castes
are anti-national. In the first place because they bring about separation in social life. They are anti-national also because they generate jealousy and antipathy between caste and caste. But we must overcome all these difficulties if we wish to become a nation in reality. For fraternity can be a fact only when there is a nation. Without fraternity equality and liberty will be no deeper than coats of paint.

These are my reflections about the tasks that lie ahead of us. They may not be very pleasant to some. But there can be no gainsaying that political power in this country has too long been the monopoly of a few and the many are only beasts of burden, but also beasts of prey. This monopoly has not merely deprived them of their chance of betterment; it has sapped them of what may be called the significance of life. These down-trodden classes are tired of being governed. They are impatient to govern themselves. This urge for self-realization in the down-trodden classes must no be allowed to devolve into a class struggle or class war. It would lead to a division of the House. That would indeed be a day of disaster. For, as has been well said by Abraham Lincoln, a House divided against itself cannot stand very long. Therefore the sooner room is made for the realization of their aspiration, the better for the few, the better for the country, the better for the maintenance for its independence and the better for the continuance of its democratic structure. This can only be done by the establishment of equality and fraternity in all spheres of life. That is why I have laid so much stresses on them.

I do not wish to weary the House any further. Independence is no doubt a matter of joy. But let us not forget that this independence has thrown on us great responsibilities. By independence, we have lost the excuse of blaming the British for anything going wrong. If hereafter’ things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame. Except ourselves. There is great danger of things going wrong. Times are fast-changing. People including our own are being moved by new ideologies. They are getting tired of Government by the people. They are prepared to have Governments for the people and are indifferent whether it is Government of the people and by the people. If we wish to preserve the Constitution in which we have sought to enshrine the principle of Government of the people, for the people and by the people, let us resolve not to be tardy in the recognition of the evils that lie across our path and which induce people to prefer Government for the people to Government by the people, nor to be weak in our initiative to remove them. That is the only way to serve the country. I know of no better,

(NOVEMBER 25, 1949)

Thursday, September 2, 2021

What is the punishment for drugs in India?

 What is the punishment for drugs in India?


Consumption of drugs is illegal and results in a jail term of up to six months or one year and/or a fine, depending on the substance consumed. 57 The consumption of heroin and cocaine will lead to a lengthier sentence of imprisonment while cannabis will lead to a less severe sentence.


Morphine, cocaine, heroin -Punishment is Rigorous imprisonment up to 1 year or fine up to Rs. 20,000 or both. And for consumption of some other drugs- Imprisonment up to 6 months or fine up to Rs. 10,000 or both.19-Jul-2017


What is the punishment for drugs in India?

where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but which may extend to 20 years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than ₹1 lakh but which may extend to ₹2 lakh.What is the punishment for drugs in India?

where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but which may extend to 20 years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than ₹1 lakh but which may extend to ₹2 lakh.

Tuesday, July 6, 2021

Supreme Court pulls up government on COVID-19 ex gratia

 Supreme Court pulls up government on COVID-19 ex gratia

Krishnadas RajagopalNEW DELHI: , JUNE 30, 2021 12:35 IST

UPDATED: JUNE 30, 2021 22:39 IST

SHARE ARTICLEPRINTA A A


A view of the Supreme Court of India. File   | Photo Credit: S. Subramanium


It gives the National Disaster Management Authority 6 weeks to fix rules for compensation to COVID-19 victims’ kin.

The Supreme Court on Wednesday pulled up the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), of which the Prime Minister is the ex officio chairperson, for “failing to perform its duty” to recommend ex gratia assistance for families of those who lost their loved ones to the COVID-19 pandemic.


Also read: ₹10 lakh corpus fund for every child orphaned by COVID-19


“The National Authority [NDMA] failed to perform its duty,” the Supreme Court held.


A Bench led by Justice Ashok Bhushan gave the NDMA six weeks to frame the guidelines for fixing the ex gratia meant for these families. The court, however, left it to the “wisdom” of the NDMA to fix the amount of ex gratia. The PIL petitioners, advocate Gaurav Kumar Bansal and Reepak Kansal, had asked for a payment of ₹4 lakh each to the families of the COVID-19 dead.


Editorial | A time to give


“Not proper for the court to ask government to pay a particular amount,” the court said.


The judgment, pronounced by Justice M.R. Shah on the Bench, held that the government could not excuse itself of its duty to pay ex gratia by saying that such payments would entail huge expenditure.


The court pointed to Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act of 2005 and said the term ‘minimum standards of relief’ mentioned in the provision included payment of ex gratia.


Justice Shah dismissed Solicitor General Tushar Mehta’s submission that Section 12 was merely “recommendatory” and not mandatory. Instead, the court drew the government’s attention to the word “shall” used in Section 12 and said this made the payment of ex gratia to victims’ families a “mandatory and statutory duty”.


The court, in this regard, said Section 12 (iii) held that “the National Authority shall recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by disaster, which shall include ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life…”


Death certificates

The court, meanwhile, directed that death certificates of COVID-19 patients should show the “exact cause of death”. As regards insurance and social security claims of those affected by COVID-19, the court ordered the Union of India to take “appropriate steps” in compliance with the 15th Finance Commission Report.


In its last hearing on July 21, before reserving the case for judgment, the Supreme Court had asked the government whether it had taken a positive “decision” to not pay ex gratia to the families of those who died of the virus.


“Is there any decision taken that there is no need to pay ex gratia? Is there a decision or is it a case of ‘no decision’ ?” Justice Bhushan had asked Mr. Mehta.


“Where is the decision that there is no need for ex gratia?” Justice Shah had also enquired.


Justice Shah even asked whether the government, by maintaining that COVID-19 was not a “one-time disaster”, inferring that the Disaster Management Act would not apply to the pandemic.


The questions from the Bench had come even as the Centre clarified that it had money for ex gratia aid, but the focus now was on utilising funds for food, medical care, oxygen, vaccination and to pump up the economy.


“But if they do have the money, why should they not comply with their statutory obligation under Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act to provide ex gratia assistance to COVID victims?” senior advocate S.B. Upadhyay, for the petitioners, had demanded.


The government had itself declared COVID-19 a national disaster, he had submitted.


The petitioners had also highlighted a 2015 notification which required the government to pay an ex gratia of ₹4 lakh each to victims’ families under Section 12. The Centre could not cite financial constraints to elude its statutory duty to pay compensation now, Mr. Upadhyay had contended.

Supreme Court 'shocked' over scrapped Section 66A law's use in FIRs, issues notice to Centre

 Supreme Court 'shocked' over scrapped Section 66A law's use in FIRs, issues notice to Centre

While Section 66A of the IT Act was scrapped by the Supreme Court several years ago, it still remains in use. The court on Monday issued a notice to the Centre saying it's shocking.

ADVERTISEMENT

Aneesha Mathur

Aneesha Mathur 

New Delhi

July 5, 2021UPDATED: July 5, 2021 13:06 IST

Section 66A of IT Act 

The Supreme Court it is shocking that the judgment striking down Section 66A of IT Act has not been implemented even now. (PTI)

The Supreme Court on Monday issued a notice to the Centre on the use of Section 66A of the IT Act that was scrapped several years ago and said that it is shocking that the judgment striking down the law has not been implemented even now.


The notice came during the hearing of a plea filed by PUCL that pointed out that even after 7 years of the law being struck down, as of March 2021, a total of 745 cases are still pending and active before the district courts in 11 states, wherein the accused persons are being prosecuted for offences under Section 66A of the IT Act.


The plea is based on data collated by the Internet Freedom Foundation, which has been tracking cases under the "Zombie provisions" which have been declared invalid but are still being used by police to prosecute people.


It shows that even after March 2015, after the Shreya Singhal Judgment which struck down Section 66A, 1,307 cases were registered under the law.


The Attorney General of India, KK Venugopal on Monday informed the Supreme court that the "statute books" still carry Section 66A of the IT Act, which was struck down as unconstitutional.


"If your lordships see the IT Act book, there is only a small asterisk and a footnote that says deleted by order of Supreme court. No one reads the footnote," said Venugopal.


He further added that "the section itself needs to read, ‘Struck down by the Supreme Court’ and the old text could be there in the footnote" so that police officials are not "confused".


"This is shocking," observed the bench headed by Justice RF Nariman. "Implementation is a problem. You read my dissent in the Sabarimala case," commented Justice Nariman.


Section 66A of the IT Act was used to punish online communication which is considered "grossly offensive, menacing, or to send communication which the sender "knows to be false to cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will." The provision was struck down by the Supreme court on 24 March 2015.


The court in its 2015 judgment has noted that the provision was "vague and arbitrary".


The NGO’s plea had sought court orders to the Centre, through NCRB or another agency, "to collect all the data/information regarding FIRs/investigations where Section 66A has been invoked as well as pendency of cases in the courts (District Courts/High Courts) throughout the country where proceedings under Section 66A are continuing in violation of the judgment".


The plea has said 381 cases have been registered in Maharashtra, 295 in Jharkhand and 245 in UP since the 2015 Supreme Court judgment.